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Laws
and the Minister of Finance (Conclusion)
Introduction
This two-part
article which concludes today was influenced by the passage of the Fiscal
Management and Accountability Act (FMA) which received presidential assent
and therefore became law, but not operational, on December 16, 2003. The act
replaces certain sections of the Financial Administration and Audit Act and
provides for the preparation and execution of the annual budget, the
receipt, control and disbursement of public monies and "such other matters
connected with or incidental to the efficient management of the finances of
Guyana."
It is a major piece
of legislation with considerable scope and depth. It has eighty-seven
sections in some fifteen parts, and one Schedule entitled 'Budget Agencies'
including quite controversially the Guyana Elections Commis-sion and other
constitutional bodies including the Office of the Ombudsman, the Auditor
General's Office and the Supreme Court. Any suggestions which these bodies
might have entertained about independence are shattered by this 'modern'
legislation which puts their financial well-being firmly under the Minister
of Finance and Cabinet. It is extremely ironic that the chief tax-collecting
agency of the government is not a budget agency, while the elections
commission is.
Donor-driven legislation
The act provides
that different sections of the act may come into operation by Order
prescribed by the Minister of Finance, but no later than one year after its
enactment. Imagine the absurdity inherent in legislation which imposes
duties on a particular minister but which allows that same minister to
decide when he will begin to meet those obligations and execute those
duties. Those in the private sector would love to have a job description
which allows them to decide when they may regard themselves bound by any
specific matters on their list.
The FMA is another
in-the-stream piece of legislation which is largely driven by the donor
community, but for which the Government takes all the credit. The donor
community has obviously been very concerned about the absence of
accountability and transparency in government expenditure, a significant
portion of which is financed by debt forgiveness, grants and loans. This
lack of transparency in Government's financial affairs was a key focus of
recent studies of the World Bank, including the Governance Report which drew
such a hostile reaction from the Government. This column is not convinced,
however, that our accountability problems have anything to do with
legislation which is analogous to and reminiscent of those CEOs who point to
ambiguities in the law to explain their poor governance practices. Since
there is nothing in the FMA which the Government could not do simply as a
matter of good practice, its commitment is questionable, and the guarantee
of the legislation achieving its objective cannot be taken for granted.
Ethics in government
The legislation is
also interesting in identifying three levels of responsibility in the
Ministry of Finance - those of the minister, the ministry for which he holds
constitutional responsibility and the finance secretary who ranks as the
permanent secretary of the ministry. (Does this mean that the position of
secretary to the treasury now held by Mr Neermal Rekha has been made
redundant?) The separate descriptions of these responsibilities seem to
confuse more than educate, and it is hard to believe that there was so
little debate on the bill passed in Parliament on December 15 and incredibly
assented to by the President the very next day. Could it be that Cabinet had
fully discussed the bill in advance, and how does this differ from other
legislation which is delayed sometimes for months for want of presidential
assent? Many believe that the passage of the act was a precondition for the
E-HIPC approval a few days later, which the President described as Guyana's
best Christmas gift. Whatever it was, Business Page invites someone from the
Government, preferably the Minister of Finance to explain this act to the
nation. Can someone also explain why Part III includes in its title "... And
Presentation to the National Assembly" when that is in fact done in Part IV?
In assigning
responsibility for the use of public funds to the head of each budget
agency, Section II speaks not only of efficient and effective use, but also
introduces without any definition or clarification the concept of ethical
action! The question here is who has the right to bring an action against
the head of a budget agency for action not considered ethical action?
Cabinet is not regarded as a budget agency, but has considerable authority
to direct particular action in, for example, political appointments under
special contracts that are difficult to justify on efficiency grounds. Who
under this act will be held responsible?
Gap
There does appear
to be a gap between the budget submission by the agency (section 14) and the
annual budget proposal submitted to the National Assembly (section 17) and
no room for the Public Accounts or Economics Committee of the National
Assembly. Legislative commitment on this would have made the whole process
more efficient and given the opposition in the assembly some assurance that
the commitment to shared governance is more than talk.
The new law does
not explicitly require the budget to be presented and approved before the
beginning of the budget year, although section 15 provides that the annual
budget proposal "shall include a) the annual financial plan for the next
ensuing fiscal year." The budget proposal, and accompanying presentation
which is not referred to in the FMA, should cause less sleep in the National
Assembly when the budget speech is read, as at least some of its contents
must now be very specific and include several, but not all of the matters
for which this columnist has been calling for more than a decade. The
proposal is required to include "tabulations and analyses of actual and
projected" expenditure, including investments and tax, non-tax and other
revenues, all for "the past relevant years, and the current year, the next
ensuing fiscal year, and the next three fiscal years, including proposed
changes to the Government's revenue bases required to support the
expenditure proposals of the government," and "a discussion of any new or
changed expenditure policy by the government."
Will this all be
'waffle,' or can we expect serious planning and substance from a Minister
who has so far disappointed by his failure to understand his primary
responsibilities under several important pieces of legislation? And can the
nation expect the Minister to explain shortfalls in both revenue and
expenditure and why policy decisions have not been given effect to?
Lottery Fund
Where the act is
still deficient is in requiring the Minister to state his expectations with
respect to tax changes; the ambiguities with respect to a term such as a
statement, which is merely a tabulation or an explanation; what "details of
the fiscal relationship between the Government and the regions" really
means; and whether the accounting standards referred to in the definition
section of the act are the international standards applicable to the public
sector, or some nebulous standards used purely for convenience. And where it
is particularly troubling is under section 39 where it is permissible for an
extra-budgetary fund to be created by an act funded by specific earmarked
funds that operate apart from the Consolidated Fund and whose "transactions
are not included in the annual budget." It is hard when one reads this not
to think of the lottery funds which continue to be used unlawfully.
The act also
provides for the preparation and approval of the budgets of statutory bodies
(defined as "a public entity established by law") which the Minister of
Finance must submit to the National Assembly no later than the time of the
submission of the annual budget proposal. It provides as well for the
submission of annual reports and audited financial statements to the
concerned minister who must then present these to the National Assembly
within two months.
Flouting the law
This is a welcome
development but one which does not apply to the Minister of Finance who
continues to flout the law in respect of submitting to the National Assembly
reports of the NIS and the GRA, among others. The act is also silent on
timelines and penalties, and despite its objectives, it is far too
permissive to make a whole lot of difference to a politician who is not
over-enthusiastic about the niceties of legislation. Does administrative law
impose any constraints on a minister who fails to comply with a statutory
requirement, or is this a matter of executive conduct which even the threat
of elections does not influence?
The
responsibilities of the Minister of Finance are set out in several pieces of
legislation and range from appointing members of the governing bodies,
giving direction, approving salaries, receiving reports and seeking advice,
etc, under such acts as the Bank of Guyana Act, the NIS Act, the Money
Laundering Act, the Guyana Revenue Act, all the tax acts, the Statistical
Bureau Act, parts of the Companies Act, the Financial Institutions Act, the
Securities Industry Act, etc. The evidence is that the Minister has signally
failed to make these acts truly effective, and to believe that the Minister
will be better at the FMA than he has been at ensuring compliance and
effectiveness with other legislation is to display unwarranted optimism.
Coming after
legislation such as the Integrity Act and the Procurement Act, the FMA is
already being met with cynicism fed by the Minister's unwillingness to pull
out all the stops to bring it into early effect. The Government has already
announced that the key sections will not come into effect until December
this year. Does this mean then that at best the new budget preparation
arrangements which would have begun no later than July 1, 2004 for 2005 will
not be in place? Does this then mean that the 2005 Budget will not be
prepared in accordance with the FMA? Can the over-silent Minister of Finance
please save the nation the uncertainty?
Conclusion
This act is both
ambiguous and ambitious, but the major threats to its effectiveness are a
Minister of Finance who has failed to impress the nation with his energy,
imagination and initiative; a President who continues to interfere in the
administration of the ministry; a paucity of relevant skills; and the
absence of sanctions to deal with underperformance and failures. There is no
Finance Secretary in place and the planning and policy-making capacity of
the ministry is either non-existent or very limited. Its greatest strength
lies in the Budget Division which is only a small part of the financial
architecture.
Perhaps the single
most important challenge with respect to the national revenues and
expenditure falls well outside of any financial laws we may pass, and that
is having an executive President who is the de facto Finance Minister, who
is not a member of or accountable to the National Assembly. Under this
arrangement the Finance Minister has the unenviable task of fetching water
in a basket.
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