 |
Guyana Stock feeds Incorporated Annual Report 2002
Introduction
In today’s Business Page we review the Annual Report of Guyana Stock feeds
Incorporated which held its 42nd Annual General Meeting on June 28, 2003 at
the Hotel Tower. It is the fifth full year of operation as a privatised
entity and the company’s Executive Chairman Robert Badal, ACCA, MBA, stated
that the company “enjoyed reasonably good performance despite an extremely
difficult year for many companies”.
Following the July 17, 2002 assertion by the Chairman that the exports of
feed to Suriname which commenced in February 2001 “had continued to
increase” the 2002 report indicates that market held steady. It also
referred to the fact that the company had commenced the hatching of eggs.
Last year’s report had indicated that the company had purchased a
state-of-the-art parboiled plant but this year’s report alludes to
significant capital expenditure work-in-progress on a state-of-the-art
parboiled rice plant.
The reader has to assume that the two references are to the same plant which
when it comes on stream in October 2003 would have taken almost two years to
become operational. While in both years reference is made to projected
revenue of US$8Mn and profits of US$1.2Mn, there is no indication of the
amount expended to date or the funds required to complete the plant.
Consequently it is difficult to assess the potential rate of return on this
significant investment.
The financial results for 2002 indicate that the company has stumbled
although it generated a significant volume of profit, earnings per share,
profitability and cash flows have declined dramatically. The serious
problems of governance continue and the company continues to battle
opponents of its controversial plant. Reports in the press indicate that the
company may still have a number of hurdles to overcome before this plant can
be put into operation. Already the plant appears to be behind schedule and
further delays could have serious implications for the company. Mr. Badal
continues in the 2002 report to call for the stock market (which has since
been established) and laments the inability of companies “growing at the
rate of Guyana Stock feeds” to access cheap capital.
It is informative and unsurprising that the company, whose Chief Executive
Officer controls 85.7% of the voting shares, has had no activity in its
shares since the advent of the stock market for which Mr. Badal has been
vocal in his support. Prospective shareholders would be justifiably
concerned when a single individual can exert this much influence over an
entity. Mr. Badal’s criticisms of the Government would have sounded less
hollow had he paid even passing acknowledgement to the Securities Industry
Act, which became operational since July 2002, by ensuring that the report
provided all the disclosures required under the Act.
Governance
The Companies Act requires companies to
hold their annual general meetings not later than six months after the end
of the accounting year and the company complied with this requirement. Again
the financial statements did not disclose as is required under the law and
relevant International Accounting Standards, the remuneration of the
executive directors including the Chairman, which is no less acceptable
because it is a problem not uncommon in Guyana. Despite remonstrations to
the contrary, the International Accounting Standards are explicit on this
issue.
The company has had only four directors since February 28 2002 when
Chartered Accountant Mr. Noel Narine, head of PKF Barcellos, Narine &
Company resigned. One of the remaining Directors is an associate of the
company’s Legal Advisors with whom presumably there would be transactions.
Neither this relationship nor any details of transactions with the firm of
Legal Advisors, which must surely be considered a related party requiring
disclosure under International Accounting Standards, has been disclosed in
the financial statements.
It is also noteworthy that there is not even a cursory reference to any
issues of governance in either the Chairman’s or Directors’ reports. The
paucity in the content of both these reports leaves one with the impression
that they were merely prepared to satisfy a requirement rather than to
provide shareholders with useful information about the operations of the
company, its performance and its prospects. This disdainful message cannot
be lost on prospective shareholders.
For reasons which are far from apparent the company continues to transact
significant volume and value of its transactions with companies owned
privately by its controlling shareholder without fully disclosing “the types
of transactions and the elements of the transactions necessary for an
understanding of the financial statements.” (IAS 24). The reader is left to
wonder about the pricing policies affecting the transactions and the profits
that may be derived there from.
The Annual Report did not acknowledge the legal battle between the company
and the Government currently before the court. This involves a rights and
bonus issue of shares which saw Mr. Badal’s interest increase from 35% to
85.7% and the Government’s interest marginalized. Business Page fails to
understand why the Privatisation Unit did not intervene in the payment of
$60Mn in dividends in 2002 of which $51Mn would have been paid to Mr. Badal.
By way of contrast over the three year period to December 31, 2002 the total
cash received from the issue of shares was a mere $37.5Mn although the share
capital moved from $2.8Mn to $379Mn.
The business
The
activities of the company include the manufacture and sale of poultry and
livestock feeds and it is also part of the business interests of the
controlling shareholder that involve National Edible Oil and Fats Inc., El
Dorado Rice Mills Inc. and El Dorado Restaurants. It has also commissioned
its hatchery through which it intends to supply eggs to poultry farmers and
cement its role as a partner in the poultry business rather than a mere feed
supplier.
We summarise below the 2002 financial results of the company which are
extracted from the audited accounts included in the Report and offer some
indicators which may be useful to readers.
Profit and
Loss Account
|
|
2002 |
2001 |
change |
|
|
(G$’M) |
(G$’M) |
% |
|
Sales |
1,984 |
1,873 |
6 |
|
Profit before Tax |
123 |
258 |
(52) |
|
Taxation |
47 |
95 |
(51) |
|
Profit after Tax |
75 |
163 |
(54) |
|
Dividends |
48 |
24 |
100 |
|
Earnings per Share (in $) |
1.07 |
2.31 |
(54) |
Profitability
|
|
2002 |
2001 |
|
Net Profit Margin (%) |
4 |
9 |
|
Return on assets (%) |
10 |
19 |
|
Return on
equity(%) |
18 |
36 |
The turnover of the company
increased by 6% which one can only assume is the result of increased volumes
since the report indicates that the company was unable to increase prices,
while pre-tax profits declined by 52% from 2001 levels as opposed to a 244%
increase in 2001 over 2000. The Chairman reported that this decrease was due
mainly to the increase in grain prices as well as increased provisioning for
bad debts and higher depreciation charges. The higher grain prices would be
reflected in the cost of sales which increased by only 8%. This implies that
the “more than 30 %” increase in grain prices was offset by efficiencies and
compensating cost savings elsewhere in the production process.
The financial statements disclosed no information on the provisions for bad
debts but it was noted that receivables declined from $97.6Mn to $54.5Mn
while the depreciation charges for the year increased by $16.6Mn. Even in
the unlikely event that the entire change of $43.1Mn in the receivables
balance was due to provisioning, these two factors do not explain the
$111.2Mn or 78% increase in administrative expenses. Neither the information
provided in the financial statements nor the reports of the Chairman or
Directors provide shareholders with any acceptable explanation of why the
company “saw its pre-tax profits adjusted downwards from $258Mn to $76Mn”
(this should be $123Mn) as stated in the Chairman’s report.
The “policy of stringent cost controls as well as cost-reducing investments
in 2000” alluded to in the 2001 report have obviously not had the same
result in 2002.
Dividends per share increased by 100% from $0.34 per share to $0.68 per
share and with a payout of $48Mn will consume 63% of after tax earnings,
which appear excessive in view of the company’s expansion plans. In the
preceding year, dividends of $24Mn represented 14.7% of after-tax earnings.
This is all the more disconcerting when one considers that operating cash
flow decreased by $547.4Mn, a whopping 97% decline and net cash from
operations was a negative $9.4Mn as opposed to positive $561Mn in 2001. When
one considers its working capital position (current assets to current
liabilities), the company will not be able to generate adequate funds from
internal sources to fund its operations and expansion projects and
additional financing will be necessary. These funds will have to come from
either bank financing, which the chairman has already indicated is not a
viable proposition, or the equity market where issues with the control of
the company’s shares and governance of the entity will certainly arise.
Balance Sheet
|
|
2002 |
2001 |
change |
|
|
(G$’M) |
(G$’M) |
% |
|
Current Assets |
256 |
323 |
(21) |
|
Current Liabilities |
277 |
449 |
(38) |
|
Working Capital |
(21) |
(126) |
83 |
|
Fixed Assets |
1,067 |
1,053 |
1 |
|
Equity |
761 |
734 |
4 |
The balance sheet remains strong with shareholders equity increasing by
$27Mn and the debt to equity ratio at .37. Current assets have decreased
from $323Mn. to $256Mn.and current liabilities have been reduced from $449Mn
to $277Mn with the company managing to shave $209Mn dollars from its trade
creditors and other payable balances. The company has utilized a significant
portion of its internally generated funds to eliminate some of its
short-term liabilities. This has resulted in an improved current ratio from
.72 in 2001 to .92 in 2002 but without any information on provisions for bad
debts and inventory obsolescence it is impossible to evaluate the true
strength of the company’s working capital position.
During 2002 the company entered into a credit facility agreement for a term
loan of US$677,599 mainly to finance the acquisition of plant, machinery and
equipment at a rate of interest of 2.86% which is extremely favourable and
is indicative of the company’s ability to source low cost financing outside
of the local banking system. The almost 90% increase in the level of
overdraft, the interest rate on which is not disclosed, to $74Mn is of some
concern since neither the operating margins nor the profit return indicators
support the adoption of a strategy that utilizes expensive short term money
to fund either operations or longer term capital expenditure.
Fixed Assets increased by 9% due mainly to acquisition of land and buildings
amounting to $49.9Mn and Work-In-Progress related to the state-of-the-art
Parboiled Rice Plant of $53.4Mn.which the company expects to result in
increased sales and profits by US$8M and US$1.2M respectively per annum.
Given the increased competition as a result of the entry into the market by
Didco Trading, these expectations seem over-optimistic and failure to
achieve them may lead to overtrading.
Conclusion
The company’s performance in 2002 has been significantly less impressive
than its stellar previous year results and although it generated after-tax
profits of $75.5Mn, a 6% increase in sales is hardly a realistic measure of
“good performance” and “laudable results”. The high level of administrative
expenses, even though there has been some reclassification of 2001 amounts
($13.9Mn to cost of sales and 6Mn to interest expense), casts doubts over
management’s attention to this area. With the exception of Gross Margin, all
of the company’s profitability and return indicators have declined by at
least 50% and this should be of concern to both management and the minority
shareholders.
In addition despite the majority shareholding held by Mr. Badal, it should
not be forgotten that this is a public company. It must therefore adhere to
the principles of good corporate governance that would ensure protection of
the interest of all its shareholders.
In managing the post-privatisation period the Government has not only failed
to protect its and by extension taxpayers’ interests but has also exposed
minority shareholders as well. It is not too late for this to be
corrected.
|
 |