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Lessons Of Enron
- Part 2
Introduction
In Part 1 of this article published two weeks ago, we looked at the
demise of Enron, one of the largest companies in the United States, and the
actions by its executives, auditors and professional advisers that are
reported to have precipitated the collapse. No day seems to go by without
further revelations involving one or the other of the Big 5 Firms, each of
which casts a pall of uncertainty and suspicion over the entire accounting
profession. PricewaterhouseCoopers has been added to the Enron probe for its
role in providing consulting advice to Enron on one of the now notorious
off-balance sheet partnerships in which Enron had a stake while it was
simultaneously providing tax advice to two of those very partnerships. And
everyone is now asking how it is at all possible for Deloitte & Touche
to have given Arthur Andersen a clean report following their recent peer
review of (Andersen). Then during the week, Ernst & Young was subpoenaed
to attend an SEC hearing into the failure of one of its banking clients with
the name PNC Financial Services Group.
It would be naive to believe that the profession and businesses in Guyana
are insulated from the shenanigans playing out so far mostly in the United
States. Four of the Big 5 operate in Guyana through correspondent-type
relationships while the fifth has full member firm status. The parent
company of GT&T, whose accounting practices have been questioned on a
number of occasions, is audited by Arthur Andersen. All of our major
companies, financial institutions and insurance companies are audited by a
firm connected with the Big 5 which set the standards of quality of audits
and integrity for all their associates. The attempt by Andersen in the UK to
distance itself from the misfortune of its US arm is particularly
disingenuous since Andersen, like the other top firms, prides itself on its
worldwide, seamless service.
Few people have any confidence in the standards of morality in the public
or private sector Guyana and everyone knows about the absence of regulatory
mechanisms to curb improper and illegal practices in those sectors.
Corruption is so widespread that it is taken for granted in a society that
demonstrates extreme forbearance for illicit behavior. Indeed, we place our
professionals on a pedestal even as rumours abound of their failure to
demonstrate the kind of ethical conduct to be expected from our leaders. As
a percentage of their membership, more accountants have been granted
national awards than any other group of professionals, a clear if mistaken
acceptance of the high ethical standards which accountants assert as the
hallmark of their profession.
Fortunately, for this purpose, we have few public companies but is it not
time that we ask ourselves whether the audit reports presented to
shareholders at the ritual which passes for the annual general meetings do
give a true picture of the company's operations and financial condition. Is
it not just possible that by our tolerance, we are encouraging our own mini-Enrons?
Is it not time that we review the disclosure requirements of the Companies
Act and compliance therewith, the quality of governance in our public
companies and the free rein given to accountants to regulate themselves? The
problems of Enron started when it announced some restatement of prior years
earnings, a situation which has surfaced on numerous occasions in Guyana
whenever there was a change of auditors. If accountants are following the
same rules, why should a change of auditors result in different profit
figures?
Unfortunate Professional Oversight?
No society can survive without a credible system of accounting and
reporting and pre-Enron, the accounting profession had boldly protested its
integrity and stoutly defended its rights to regulate itself. But that right
must not only be earned, but its foundation rests entirely on the
maintenance of public trust. Auditors are expected to be able to provide
objective, professional opinions and therefore the public must be assured
that their actions and conduct are of the highest order.
They are expected to behave above reproach in all their professional
dealings but regrettably some leading practitioners fall short of the ideals
and values which ought to be their hallmark. One firm carries a particularly
misleading advertisement in the Telephone Directory while another which has
recently changed its relationship with one of the Big 5, not only still
sports the billboard of its previous incarnation but has failed to make the
professional announcement which normally accompanies such a change. While
these may be no more than oversight, they contribute to public misgivings
that the profession can be left to define integrity and ethical conduct
which are clearly public interest issues. They also raise questions within
the profession as to whether accounting and auditing are now seen as
business with profit as the major objective.
At the other end of the spectrum, the poor standard of work of some of
the firms which are recognised by the Companies Act and which are granted
practicing certificates by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Guyana
(ICAG) is well known in professional circles but nothing is being done to
correct this situation. So bad did this situation become that one of the
country's leading commercial banks found it necessary to establish its own
rating system of the firms.
Pressures On Auditors
As this article will show conditions and practices in Guyana encourage
Enron type behaviour. The position of the auditor is a difficult one. The
law requires that even the smallest cake shop, once it falls under the
Companies Act must have its books audited by a member of the ICAG, even if
the rudimentary systems make those books unauditable. While the new
Companies Act provides mechanisms to protect the auditor's independence,
very little has changed in practice and the auditor is expected to be the
poodle of the directors whom he dare not offend for fear of losing the
client and fees. One not so leading public company fired its auditors
because they insisted that the disclosure requirement of the law be met and
deliberately misled its shareholders as to the reason for the change. The
Private Sector Commission in its eagerness to change auditors has ignored
all the provisions of the law and at this stage is still without a
functioning auditor for the year 2001. Both these cases arose because of
audit-related disclosure issues and encapsulate the attitude of local
Directors to accurate reporting. Worse, it says something about the
profession that there seems to be other auditing firms that are only too
willing to collude in such improper behaviour.
Sometimes though no pressure is required. There was the case of the
internal auditor of a local public company whose serious approach to his job
was more than the CEO could take. To get rid of the poor chap, the CEO
requested the external audit firm to employ him. Instead of resisting, the
firm readily agreed.
Directors
Non-executive directors are usually drawn from a
pool of exclusive individuals with considerable influence and prestige in
society and no one questions their actions and competence. They design
schemes which guarantee them pensions and in many cases a position on the
board long past their useful lives. So pervasive is this attitude to
non-interference in board appointments that even where the law requires it,
the regulators have shown striking reluctance to intervene as in the case of
Financial Institutions Act. (FIA) One hopes that in the post-Enron/ Globe
Trust era directors would be more careful in discharging their statutory and
fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders and third parties and that
regulators will take action in appropriate cases.
Directors' remuneration
This area has a wonderful parallel with the Enron
case where at best Andersen relied on legal counsel for comfort in respect
of the off-balance sheet transactions. In Guyana, despite compelling
counter-arguments and the provisions of the Companies Act, many companies do
not disclose the emoluments paid to their directors. That the shareholders
have no clue of the emoluments paid to their executive directors makes a
mockery of the very basic principles of corporate governance.
Very conveniently, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Guyana is
relying on an advice that disclosure is required only of payments made in
the capacity of directors and not of managers. Is it not a complete
farce that the fees of a few thousand dollars paid to the directors whether
executive or non-executive has to be disclosed while the hundreds of
thousands received as an executive director remain a closely guarded secret?
Whose company is it anyway and do they not have a right to know?
(To be continued next week)
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